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This paper discusses how the position of independent administrative agencies, with broad 
regulatory powers, can be reconciled with the US Constitution and how the legitimacy of their 
regulatory actions can be ensured. The experiences with the problems of legitimacy of US 
administrative agencies might well contribute to the resolution of questions that arise as 
regards the constitutional position of (independent) regulatory agencies in the EC Member 
States. 
 
The US constitution is based on the principle of the Separation of Powers, reflected in 
Articles I, II and III of the Constitution
2. Pursuant to Article I all legislative powers granted in 
the Constitution are vested in Congress. Pursuant to Article II the Executive Power shall be 
vested in a President. Article III vests the judicial Power of the United States in one Supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish. The Framers of the Constitution had the conviction that the centralized 
accumulation of power in any person or single group of persons meant tyranny: the division 
and separation of powers, both vertically (along the axis of federal, state, and local authority) 
and horizontally (along the axis of legislative, executive and judicial authority) meant liberty
3. 
It was thus essential that no department, branch or level of government would have the power 
to achieve dominance on its own
4.   
 
Except for the institution of these named three branches, the US Constitution does not provide 
any further information on how central government must be organized nor on the question of 
how ‘legislative’, ‘executive’ and ‘judicial’ must be defined
5. Neither does the Constitution 
explicitly mention the power of Congress to found administrative agencies
6.  
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It might seem that the position and the powers of the administrative agencies contravene the 
Separation of Powers principle in three ways. Firstly, Congress has founded agencies, headed 
by officers that do not serve at the will of the President, meaning the latter is restricted in 
removing them from office. These agencies are commonly referred to as the independent or 
regulatory agencies. These agencies can be distinguished from executive agencies. The 
officers of the latter type of administrative agencies serve at the will of the President. In the 
opinion of critics of the administrative state the position and the powers of the independent 
administrative agencies contradict with the Separation of Powers principle of the 
Constitution
7. Indeed, it can be questioned whether Congress can legitimately place agencies 
with a mandate to execute the law out of control of the President.  
Secondly, when Congress adopts acts it usually delegates broad regulatory powers to 
administrative agencies to implement the acts. It is not uncommon for Congress to leave it up 
to the agency to take important policy decisions on which Congress itself could reach no 
consensus. This means that non-elected officials may have the power to create new rights and 
obligations for the citizens. It can be questioned whether the practice of Congress to delegate 
broad rulemaking powers to the agencies does not contravene article I, which vests all 
legislative power within Congress.  
Thirdly, administrative agencies combine powers previously distributed among the President, 
Congress and the Judiciary. For instance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
formulates law by writing rules that spell out what disclosures must be made in a stock 
prospectus. The SEC then enforces these rules by prosecuting those who violate its 
regulations through disciplinary actions against broker-dealers or through stop order 
proceedings against corporate issuers. Finally, the SEC also acts as a judge and jury in 
deciding whether its rules have been violated. In exercising the latter function it conducts 
adjudicatory hearings to determine guilt and mete out punishment
8. 
 
The tremendous growth of administrative agencies with broad regulatory powers in the 
twentieth century has raised many policy and coordination problems in government. These 
developments led Brownlow to make his famous statement that the administrative agencies 
are a “headless fourth branch of government”, acting irresponsible and not being coordinated 
                                                                                                                                            
6 This contribution will only deal with independent agencies and executive agencies. Paragraph 2 
describes the distinction between these two types of agencies.   
7 P.P. Swire, ‘Incorporation of Independent Agencies into the executive branch’,  (94) Yale Law 
Review, 1985, p. 1766.    
8 E. Gellhorn en R.M. Levin, Administrative law and process, St Paul, 4 ed, 1997, p. 9-10.  
  2by the President
9.  This paper will analyse to what extent the position and the powers of 
(independent) administrative agencies conflict with the Separation of Powers principle. The 
paper mainly explores how the US Supreme Court has dealt with constitutional problems 
relating to administrative agencies and their powers. From this analysis, it will be concluded 
that the case law of the US Supreme Court, supports the view that the powers of Congress, the 
President and the Judiciary can be mingled and that there is room for Congress to adapt 
government structure to the necessities of new governmental policy. A more functional 
Separation of Powers approach will be advocated that is both legal and more practical in order 
to assess the constitutional position of administrative agencies
10.  
 
After having concluded that from a more functional Separation of Powers perspective the 
position and powers of the US (independent) administrative agencies may well be reconciled 
with the structure of the US Constitution, the paper discusses to which institutions 
administrative agencies are accountable. It is described how the actions of administrative 
agencies are checked and balanced by the President, Congress and the Judiciary. Furthermore, 
the paper illustrates the President, Congress and the Judiciary are not the only three players 
that control the agencies’ activities. Since the agencies have to follow administrative 
procedures in which the public may participate, interest groups influence the agencies’ 
activities as well.  From this overview it can be concluded that administrative agencies 
represent anything but a “headless fourth branch”. The analysis shows the process of checks 
and balances is not static, and adapts to changing economic and political circumstances.  
 
2. The role and the concept of independent agencies  
 
2.1. Organization, terminology and constitutional position  (questions 1, 2, 3, 12, 13) 
 
There are many different administrative agencies within the US administration
11. Generally, 
the administrative agencies can be classified in four categories. Firstly, there are the executive 
departments mentioned in the Constitution, which are attached to the cabinet officers who 
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12. These administrative organizations have the most important policy and 
budgetary responsibilities. Important examples are the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, 
Agriculture and Health and Human Services (HHS). Secondly, there are sub-agencies that are 
within these departments, but that are often organizationally distinct, such as the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in HHS. Thirdly, there are also agencies that are separate from 
the executive departments, but that are nonetheless ‘executive’. Here the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) are prominent 
examples. Finally, there are agencies designated ‘independent’ by Congress and they are also 
referred to as ‘regulatory agencies’. A lot of the latter agencies were founded during the New 
Deal period. Prominent agencies are: The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), The 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the 
Securities and Exchanges Commission (SEC). This paper will mainly deal with the distinction 
between ‘executive’ and ‘independent’ agencies. If the word administrative agency is used, 
both the independent and the executive agencies are meant.  
 
An important difference between independent and executive agencies is related to the 
President’s restricted power to remove officials of the independent agency. Unlike the 
officials of executive agencies, who are subject to dismissal at the will of the President, the 
President can remove the officers of independent agencies only ‘for cause’. For instance, 
pursuant to the Federal Trade Commission Act the President may remove the Commissioners 
of the FTC only ‘for inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office’. Since the 
Supreme Court has never said what ‘for cause’ means, there is no controlling judicial decision 
on how ‘independent’ the independent agencies actually are. According to some authors, the 
‘for cause clause’ ensures that a President will not be able to discipline an official for purely 
political reasons, or for no reasons at all
13. Lessig and Sunstein argue, that it would be 
possible to interpret the relevant statutes as allowing a large degree of removal and 
supervisory power to remain in the President, enabling the latter to remove the agencies 
officials for political reasons under some circumstances
14. According to Lessig and Sunstein 
the statutory words might even allow the discharge of commissioners who have frequently or 
on important occasions acted in ways inconsistent with the President’s wishes with respect to 
what is required by sound policy.  
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There are several other ways in which independent agencies can be legally or structurally 
distinguished from executive agencies
15. Like the heads of executive agencies, the officials of 
independent agencies are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. However, 
the terms of the officials of the independent agencies may exceed the four-year term of the 
President, reducing the influence of the President on the agency. In addition, the members of 
the independent commissions are required by statute to be selected on a bipartisan basis. 
Unlike the appointment of executive officials, the President is restricted to naming only a 
majority of the members of his own party: the remainder must be from the other party or 
registered independents. Sometimes independent agencies possess additional characteristics, 
although these do not have to be decisive for their independent status
16. For instance, whereas 
executive agencies tend to be shaped around single administrators, independent agencies may 
be organized as commissions consisting of five or seven members. This makes their 
deliberations and decisions the product of collegial decision-making, which is a process that 
has its closest analogue in the appellate judicial setting
17. 
 
From this analysis it follows ‘independence’ in US constitutional law means less susceptible 
to presidential control. Indeed, less susceptible indicates the President still has quite some 
power to influence the independent agencies’ actions. Although related, independence and 
impartiality are two different concepts. Since independence only relates to the amount of 
presidential control, it is a narrower concept than impartiality. Impartiality means that an 
agency should justify its decisions on objective grounds without being influenced by private 
and political interests. Administrative law imposes strict impartiality requirements on the 
agencies as regards the exercise of their adjudicatory powers in order to ensure procedural 
fairness and to prevent abuse (see paragraph 6).  
 
2.2. Are independent agencies really different from executive agencies? 
 
Although, from a legal perspective, independent agencies are to some extent independent 
from political control, it might be questioned whether those agencies enjoy a constitutional or 
legal position which is very different from executive agencies
18.  
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The President has the power to appoint, with the advice and consent by the Senate, the agency 
officials of both the independent and the executive agencies. It is generally agreed, that 
President Reagan was able to achieve significant policy changes by appointing agency heads 
who shared his objective of reducing the burdens of regulation of business
19. The political 
effects of the power to appoint officials have not been limited to executive agencies, since 
President Reagan could implement his policies through the officials of independent agencies 
as well. 
 
Although the President might remove the officers of independent agencies, unlike the officials 
of executive agencies, only ‘for cause’, the distinction between those two categories of 
agencies should not be overemphasized
20. The fixed terms of office and removal for cause 
obligations do not pose serious obstacles to the President’s ability to influence regulatory 
policy through the appointments process, because a newly elected President almost always 
has the opportunity to make key appointments early in his administration. Moreover, if the 
President formally requests an administrator’s resignation, it is not unreal that the officer will 
actually resign
21. In addition, the President can influence the independent’s agency policy by 
way of his power to appoint the chairs of the independent commissions. Although the chair 
can only be removed from the agency for cause, he holds the chairmanship at the will of the 
President, making him susceptible to the President’s policy views. Since the chair of the 
agency is responsible for the management of agency’s operations, a change in leadership 
often results in policy changes.   
 
Furthermore, from a strictly legal point of view it is not clear to what extent the President is 
really prevented from dictating policy to independent agencies. After all, the President has the 
constitutional duty to “Take care that the Laws Be Faithfully Executed”
22. This duty requires 
the President to maintain significant, ongoing relationships with all agencies for law 
administration
23. According to Strauss the unitary responsibility does not admit relationships 
in which the President is permitted so little capacity to engage in oversight that the public 
could no longer rationally believe in that responsibility
24. To the extent permitted by the 
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actions by imposing on the agencies the duty to engage in economic analysis before 
exercising their rulemaking powers. For instance, President Reagan’s Executive Order No. 
12,291
25 required agencies to adopt rules only if they were both cost-beneficial and benefit-
maximizing. Although this Order was formally not applicable to the independent agencies, 
the executive orders were widely followed by them. President Reagan made clear that he had 
left out the independent agencies to avoid political controversies, not because he believed he 
lacked authority to apply the order to the independent agencies
26. In addition to the power to 
impose the duty to engage in economic analysis, it must be assumed that the President has a 
general power to coordinate the agencies’ actions in order to ensure that overlapping policies 
of the different agencies do not conflict.    
 
It follows, that the President cannot be prevented from giving policy guidance to the agencies 
to the extent permitted by the law. However, it would seem irreconcilable with the 
independent agency’s primary decision-making power that the President would substitute the 
agency’s policy judgements with his own judgement. This, however, does not clearly 
distinguish the position of an independent agency from an executive agency, for in a sense the 
President is also prevented from dictating policy to units within the executive branch. 
Paragraph 5 discusses there is no authoritative answer to the question whether and in what 
sense the President can order executive branch officials to decide at the will of the President. 
For instance, despite the fact that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is part of the 
department of Transportation, it is questionable whether the President could directly overrule 
the FAA’s decision to grant a licence to fly, for Congress has delegated the authority to 
licence to the administrator and not to the President
27. Whether or not the President is allowed 
to substitute the agencies’ views, it is certain that his directions should remain within the legal 
boundaries of the statutes.   
 
Both the President and Congress have many formal and informal instruments to influence the 
activities of independent and executive agencies. Furthermore, it is important to note that both  
independent and administrative agencies are subject to the same procedural requirements of 
the APA (paragraph 6) and that the scope of judicial review of the agencies’ actions is the 
same for all the agencies (par. 7). Therefore, it can be concluded that the differences between 
                                                 
25 46 Fed. Reg. 13193 (1980). 
26 Strauss 1984, p. 662.  
27 S. Breyer, W.H. Stewart, C.R. Sunstein and M. L. Spitzer, Administrative Law and Regulatory 
Policy, 2002, Aspen Law, 2002, p. 118.  
  7independent and executive agencies should not be exaggerated
28. Nevertheless, in practice, 
independent agencies may be more responsive to Congress and the President treats 
independent agencies more independently than executive agencies. For instance, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) may treat the independent agencies’ budget requests or 
legislative recommendations with greater respect than those of the executive agencies
29. 
Moreover, several Presidents, with the exception of President Clinton, have been reluctant to 
allow OMB to oversee the process of regulation by independent agencies, even when such 
Presidents made serious efforts to oversee and coordinate national policy. Presidential control 
of the agencies’ actions, as well as the OMB’s reviewing role, will be discussed in more detail 
in paragraph 5. 
 
2.3. History, tasks and powers of independent agencies (questions 14, 16) 
 
Independent agencies have been active in the United States for more than a hundred years.  
For instance, the International Commerce Commission (ICC), which had the task to regulate 
the railways, was founded in 1887. The Federal Trade Commission was created in 1914 and 
was modelled after the ICC for the latter’s independent power and authority
30. With the 
creation of the FTC, it was clear that the ICC would serve as the template for a multitude of 
new independent regulatory commissions in the early twentieth century
31.  
 
Many of the independent agencies were founded in the course of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 
expanding the role of central government in economic affairs and in promoting social and 
economic rights for the citizens. The mandate of the administrative agencies to regulate 
private market behaviour can be justified on several grounds. For instance, some agencies 
have the power to regulate market behaviour in order to solve market failures, like the need to 
control monopoly power (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) or the need to compensate 
for inadequate information (Securities and Exchanges Commission). Other agencies have the 
power to redistribute resources from one group to another (National Labor Relations Board), 
or have the power to promote non-market or collective values like the environment and public 
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Commission)
32. Although, many of the federal independent agencies have the task of 
regulating private market parties, like the FERC and the FCC, some of the independent 
agencies have the task of promoting citizens’ rights. For instance, The Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission promotes equal opportunity in employment through administrative 
and judicial enforcement of the federal civil rights laws and through education and technical 
assistance. The Federal Election Commission administers and enforces the federal statutes 
governing the financing of federal elections. 
 
The reasons why Congress has insulated to some extent independent agencies from political 
control cannot be easily explained, because the legislative history on the creation of 
independent agencies does not always reveal why Congress preferred one organizational 
format over the other
33. Although there is no coherent theory on the creation of independent 
agencies, several authors have supplied a rationale for the foundation of independent 
agencies
34. It is plausible that Congress confers this status upon agencies for two reasons. The 
first reason is that some agencies should function impartially, since political forces could 
negatively affect how they carry out their tasks. This argument was, for instance, put forward 
during the debates leading to the adoption of the FTC Act. The FTC has the power to direct 
cessation of unfair methods of competition in commerce, after adjudicatory hearings. The 
assurance of impartiality and the absence of political controls are very important for a proper 
execution of the statutory scheme and the apolitical judgements to be reached
35. In addition, 
to the impartiality argument the expertise argument justifies the existence of independent 
agencies. The application of statutes, like the statutes regulating the capital and 
communications markets, requires a high degree of technical expertise. Therefore, it is 
thought that objective experts and not the politicians should apply these statutes. 
 
Independent agencies typically possess a combination of rulemaking and adjudicatory 
powers. By virtue of adjudicatory powers agencies may determine individual duties and 
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the power of the FCC to grant licences to operate broadcasting stations may serve as an 
example. By virtue of rulemaking powers agencies may formulate rules of general 
applicability.  For instance, the FCC has the power to make such regulations as it may deem 
necessary to prevent interference between radio stations and to carry out the provisions of the 
Communications Act 1934. Paragraph 6 discusses more deeply the distinction between 
adjudication and rulemaking, and more in particular the procedural requirements that apply to 
the agencies’ adjudicatory or rulemaking powers.  
 
2.4. Jurisdiction  (question 5) 
 
In addition to the federal agencies many commissions with regulatory powers operate at the 
state level. The question whether the federal agency or the state commission has the power to 
regulate a certain activity is mainly a matter of statutory interpretation. The organic acts 
determine the federal agencies’ jurisdiction, which may extend to both interstate and intrastate 
activities
36. By virtue of the Supremacy clause federal agency rules pre-empt conflicting rules 
of state authorities
37. Moreover, state rules are pre-empted in case it was the intent of 
Congress to exclude state regulation. The very existence of a federal regulatory agency may 
signify a congressional determination that the regulated subject matter demands uniform 
national supervision and that the power of the state authorities to act is withdrawn. However, 
the presence of a federal agency is not itself determinative for the question whether state 
action has been pre-empted
38. Through statutory interpretation the courts should determine 
whether and to what extent the agencies indeed enjoy the power to regulate intrastate 
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39, the Supreme Court 
rejected a FCC ruling that state regulation of depreciation of telephone equipment was pre-
empted. In the view of the Court, Congress had established a system that gave jurisdiction to 
the FCC to regulate depreciation of such equipment used in interstate communication, but left 
jurisdiction with the states, and in fact forbade the FCC to exercise jurisdiction over charges, 
classifications, and practices in connection with intrastate communication, and where in 
practice, a single piece of telephone equipment may be both used in inter- and intrastate 
communication
40. On the other hand, in AT&T Corp. et al v. IOWA Utilities
41 the Court 
confirmed the power of the FCC to implement the local competition provisions of 1996 
Telecommunications Act. The FCC had promulgated rules that determined the prices for 
interconnection and that unbundled access to the local networks should be based on Total 
Element Long Run Incremental Cost. The state commissions insisted they had the authority to 
implement these pricing rules rather than the FCC. The Court did not agree with the view of 
the state commissions. In the view of the Court, by virtue of the 1934 Communications Act 
the FCC may prescribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest 
to carry out the provisions of the 1934 Act. Since Congress expressly directed that the 1996 
Act, along with the local competition provisions, should be inserted in the Communications 
Act, the Court was of the opinion the Commission’s rulemaking authority extended to the 
implementation of local competition provisions. 
 
3.  Constitutional position of the independent agencies  
 
3.1. Constitutional questions (Questions 6,7,8) 
 
Although the independent agencies are a reality in US government, their position and powers 
have raised and still raise fundamental questions. Under the influence of President Reagan’s 
efforts to assert hierarchical control over the bureaucracy, the constitutional position of 
independent agencies was questioned. On the basis of the theory of the ‘unitary executive’, 
scholars asserted that the creation of independent agencies was constitutionally unfounded. 
The unitarian view was grounded in the Vesting Clause of Article II, which provides “The 
Executive power shall be vested in a President”. This clause, together with the Take Care 
clause, that provides that the President has the duty to “Take care that the Laws Be Faithfully 
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42, would create a hierarchical, unified executive department under the direct 
control of the President. The President alone possess all of the executive power and he 
therefore can direct, control and supervise agencies who seek to exercise discretionary 
executive power
43.  Other scholars oppose the theory of the unitary executive and advocate a 
more functional approach for the interpretation of the text of the Constitution. They claim that 
the Necessary and Proper clause
44, that provides that Congress shall have the power “ to make 
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers 
and all powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States”, grants 
Congress the power to structure the executive department and insulate subordinate officers 
from unfettered removal power of the President
45.  
 
In addition to the questions on the constitutionality of independent agencies, questions arose 
as regards the constitutionality of the delegation of broad regulatory powers to both 
independent and executive agencies
46. According to some scholars, the delegation of 
rulemaking powers to administrative agencies violated Article I, which provides that “All 
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”.   
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Despite the fact that many scholars advocated a more formal approach to the Separation of 
Powers principle, which would amount to the abolition of independent agencies and the re-
introduction of the non-delegation doctrine, the US Supreme Court, has not taken these 
dramatic steps. As will be discussed later on, the US Supreme Court has instead legitimised 
the constitutional status of independent agencies and their broad regulatory powers by 
adhering to a more functional approach to the Separation of Powers principle.   
 
3.2. The constitutional status of independent agencies: Supreme Court case law  
 
3.2.1. Myers, Humprey’s and Weiner  
 
The first case concerning the status of independent agencies is Myers v. United States
47.  
Myers was appointed postmaster for a four-year term at Portland, under a statute providing 
that postmasters “shall be appointed and may be removed by the President and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate”. President Wilson removed Myers from office, prior to the 
expiration of this term, without the consent of the Senate. The government claimed Myers’s 
removal was lawful because it is unconstitutional to limit the President’s power to remove an 
executive branch official by requiring the Senate’s agreement. The Supreme Court agreed 
with the Government and reasoned: 
 
“ the power to remove subordinates is inherently part of the executive power, which 
article II, section one, vests in a President of the United States”.   
Made responsible under the Constitution for the effective enforcement of the law, the 
President needs as an indispensable aid to meet it the disciplinary influence upon 
those who act under him of a reserve power of removal…  
… To require him to file charges and submit them to the consideration of the Senate, 
might make impossible that unity and co-ordination in executive administration 
essential to effective action”.   
 
The Court’s considerations in Myers could be read in two different ways
48. First Myers could 
be understood to mean Congress may not place any limits on the President’s power to remove 
executive officers: or it could be read as embodying the proposition that, whatever the limits 
of presidential removal power, Congress could not cede to itself any role in removing 
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  13government officials. The Court rejected the former reading in Humprey’s executor v. United 
States, where it drastically narrowed the application of the Myers rule
49.  
 
W.E. Humprey was a member of the FTC, who was nominated by President Hoover. On the 
basis of the Federal Trade Commission Act a FTC Commissioner could only be removed for 
cause, namely for ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office’. President Roosevelt 
tried to remove Humprey on the ground that the aims and purposes of the administration with 
respect to the work of the Commission can be carried out most effectively with personnel of 
his own selection, but disclaiming any reflection upon the Commissioner personally or upon 
his services. Humprey never acquiesced in his action and filed a back pay suit.  Relying on 
Myers v. United States the Government argued that Humprey’s removal was not unlawful, 
because the removal provision of the FTC Act constituted an unconstitutional interference 
with the executive power of the President. The Court did not agree with the government this 
time. It stated that in Myers it only decided the narrow point that the President had the power 
to remove a postmaster of the first class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as 
required by Act of Congress. In the view of the Court the office of postmaster is so essentially 
unlike the office at issue in Humprey that the decision in Meyers cannot be accepted as 
controlling the decision in Humprey. Unlike Myers, who was a purely executive officer, a 
FTC Commissioner occupies no place in the executive department and exercises no part of 
the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President. In the opinion of the Court 
the character of the quasi-legislative and in part quasi-judicially powers of the FTC, justified 
the restrictions of the removal power of the President. Since the Court recognized and 
accepted that the independence of the agency was necessary for carrying into effect the 
legislative policies of the Act, it was willing to accept a more functional approach to the 
Separation of Powers principle by focussing on the goals and the nature of the powers of the 
FTC. Although the Court in fact followed a more functional approach to the Separation of 
Powers Principle, it’s reasoning was not very strong, since it tried to reconcile the position of 
the FTC with the formal Separation of Powers principle by labelling the powers of the FTC as 
non-executive:  
  
“The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments of 
government entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct of indirect, of 
either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open to serious 
question”….  
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  14The power of the removal here claimed for the President falls within this principle, 
since its coercive influence threatens the independence of a commission, which is not 
wholly disconnected from the executive department, but which, as already fully 
appears, was created by Congress as means of carrying into operation legislative 
and judicial powers, and as an agency of the legislative and the judicial 
departments…”  
 
The Supreme Court confirmed its ruling in Humprey’s Executor in Weiner v. United States
50, 
a case which was comparable to Humprey’s Executor. In Weiner the Supreme Court ruled that 
President Eisenhower’s removal of a member of the War Claims Commission prior to the 
expiration of his term of appointment was invalid. In reaching this conclusion the Supreme 
Court, like in Humprey’s Executor, endorsed its view that the nature of the function that 
Congress vested in the War Claims Commission, is the most reliable factor for drawing a 
conclusion regarding the President’s power of removal.  
 
3.2.2. INS v. Chadha, Buckley v. Valeo and Bowsher 
 
The Supreme Court decided three cases that were of relevance for the position and powers of 
both independent and executive agencies in the seventies and eighties. These rulings were an 
important signal to Congress that it was illegal for Congress to retain supervisory powers over 
agency decision making after having delegated to those agencies discretionary powers. 
According to some commentators these rulings indicated that the Supreme Court had taken a 
more formal approach to the Separation of Powers principle and therefore posed a threat to 
the legality of independent agencies.  
 
Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Chadha
51 concerned the legality of the legislative 
veto. The basic goal of the legislative veto was to allow Congress an opportunity to control or 
veto agency decisions, especially if agencies acted under statutes that gave them broad 
discretion, amounting in practice to lawmaking
52. Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya, 
remained in the United States, after his visa expired. He was ordered deported. The Attorney 
General legally suspended his deportation, allowing him to remain in the United States, for 
reasons of hardship. The statute, however, provided, that either the Senate or the House of 
representatives could, by resolution, overrule the Attorney General’s suspension of 
deportation. In this case the House of Representatives enacted a resolution overturning the 
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  15Attorney General’s decision. Accordingly the deportation proceedings were resumed and 
Chadha was ordered deported. The Supreme Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for 
Congress to reserve to itself the power to overrule an executive officer. According to the 
Court the veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. Therefore, Congress was 
obliged to comply with the constitutional provisions for the adoption of legislation, which 
require the affirmative vote of both Houses as well as the concurrence of the President. In the 
absence of the President’s consent, legislation must pass each House by a two-thirds vote. 
The statutory provisions that empowered either House to overrule the Attorney General were 
an attempt to avoid these constitutional restrictions and therefore invalid. It follows from this 
ruling that Congress is not allowed to block the administration of the laws by executive 
officials, without having to follow the formal process of law making.    
 
In Buckley v. Valeo
53 it was at stake whether Congress could create a Federal Election 
Commission that was composed of members that were appointed by the leadership of the 
Senate and the House and of two members that were appointed by the President. The 
Commission was structured in this way in order to enable the political leaders in Congress to 
control the Commission. Since the Commission was authorized to bring lawsuits to enforce 
restrictions on political fund raising, it was a very sensitive topic for the political parties. The 
Supreme Court declared that the appointments to the Commission were unconstitutional, 
since they did not conform with the requirements of the Appointments Clause
54. So this was 
another unconstitutional attempt by Congress to supervise administration.  
 
In Bowsher v. Synar
55 the Court embraced the second reading of Myers that Congress cannot 
delegate any role in removing officers to itself. By virtue of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (known as the ‘Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act’), 
Congress delegated to the Comptroller General the power to review estimates of likely budget 
deficits to determine whether the estimated deficit will exceed a specified amount, and, if so, 
to determine program by program, according to statutorily specified rules, how much 
appropriated money the President must not spend. The relevant appointment statutes 
provided, that the President appoint the Comptroller General from a list of individuals, which 
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  16were recommended by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President. The Senate had to 
confirm the appointment. Congress could remove the Comptroller General for cause at any 
time by Joint Resolution (which requires a presidential signature or a two-thirds 
Congressional override of his veto).  
According to the Court the removal clause was unconstitutional:  
 
“We noted recently “The Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the 
Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive and 
Judicial…. 
That this system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, 
and discordance at times is inherent, but it was deliberately so structured to assure 
full, vigorous and open debate on the great issues affecting the people and to provide 
avenues for the operation of checks on the exercise of government power.  
We conclude that Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an 
officer charged with the execution of laws except by impeachment. To permit the 
execution of laws to be vested in an officer answerable only to Congress would, in 
practical terms, reserve in Congress control over the execution of the laws. …..The 
structure of the Constitution does not permit Congress to execute the laws…”   
 
To some critics the Court’s ruling pointed to a revival of a formal Separation of Powers 
doctrine, meaning that a case against the constitutionality of independent agencies might also 
succeed. Although the Court did seem to follow a formal Separation of Powers approach in 
Bowsher, its ruling is not well grounded since it was not clear at all that Congress could 
actually control the administration. The Bowsher removal provision actually required 
presidential participation, for Congress’s joint resolution of removal was subject to 
presidential veto. Moreover, the fact that Congress could remove the Comptroller General 
only ‘for cause’ pleaded against effective Congressional control. In fact, the Court had earlier 
argued a ‘for cause’ removal was precisely the element creating the independence from the 
President that justified delegation of judicial and legislative functions to an independent 
regulatory commission in Humprey. Thus, the proposition that the Comptroller General was 
in fact dependent of Congress by virtue of the removal provision was hard to maintain
56. 
Although the result of Bowsher was not wrong, the Court could have supported the ruling 
more convincingly by giving more attention to the impact of the Congressional arrangement 
on the President, Congress and the Judiciary, and the relationships among them
57.  Like in 
Myers, INS v. Chadha and Buckley, Congress had sought to aggrandize its powers at the 
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  17expense of the President in Bowsher. In contrast, in Humprey’s and Weiner Congress 
restricted the President’s removal power through the ‘for cause’ limitation, but it did not 
involve a comparable expansion of the Congressional role.  
 
With regard to the above it can be concluded that, neither Chadha nor Buckley or Bowsher 
suggest that the executive powers of the sort that were delegated to the Comptroller or the 




So unlike in Humprey’s and Weiner, it can be stated that Congress tried to overreach and 
seize the powers of the other Branches in INS v. Chadha, Buckley and Bowsher. Although the 
latter three rulings do not cast doubt on the constitutionality of independent agencies as such, 
commentators are of the opinion that the results of the latter three rulings strengthen the 
constitutional scheme. The rulings create pressures on Congress to take responsibility for the 
political choices that are made. Members of Congress might wish that they could legislate 
generally and imprecisely, delegating policy decisions to agencies but retaining power to 
easily overrule the agencies when decisions particularly important to them were made. 
Chadha, Buckley and Bowsher deny them that option. Congress can delegate but then it has to 
live with that choice.  
 
3.2.3.  Morrison  
 
Although the US Supreme Court has confirmed the constitutional status of independent 
agencies in Humprey’s and Weiner, its approach was quite ambiguous since it did not became 
clear at all under what conditions the agencies tasks do not qualify as executive, but as quasi 
legislative or judicial
59. Moreover, independent agencies frequently exercise functions similar 
to those performed by all three branches
60. In Morrison
61 the Court finally acknowledged that 
Humprey’s had introduced the problem whether the official functioned in an executive or in a 
‘quasi-legislative’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ role. However, apparently recognizing the imperfection 
of its analysis in Humprey’s, the Court accepted a more functional approach of the Separation 
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  18of Powers principle and insisted that the real question is whether the removal restrictions are 
of such nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty, and 
the functions of the officials in question must be analysed in that light.  
 
With regard to the above, it might be concluded that the Court recognizes the constitutionality 
of independent agencies as long as Congress has not unacceptably encroached upon the 
powers of the President, no matter what the nature of the agency’s activities are and no matter 
their position in Government.   
 
3.4.  Constitutional problems regarding the delegation of regulatory powers  
 
As mentioned before, Congress delegates various powers to administrative agencies. Whereas 
the former paragraphs explained that Congress has limited authority in controlling agencies 
that are performing delegated powers, this paragraph explains to what extent Congress can 
actually delegate regulatory powers to administrative agencies.  
 
Delegated powers may imply the operation of legislation upon an administrative agency’s 
official’ s determination of facts. Alternatively, Congress may grant authority to an agency to 
specify rules in an area where Congress itself has declared only general principles
62. This 
means that agencies may formulate new rights and duties for the governed. It is mainly the 
last category of delegations that are in tension with the Separation of Powers principle. The 
legitimacy of Congress’s powers to intrude upon private autonomy is founded upon the 
supposed consent of the governed that have elected members of Congress
63. Therefore, it 
would be illegitimate for Congress to grant those powers to officials that are not directly 
accountable to the electorate. This does not mean that the executive branch lacks 
accountability, for the President is subject to the will of the people. However, the vesting of 
lawmaking power in Congress is designed to ensure the combination of deliberation and 
accountability that comes from saying that government power cannot be brought to bear on 
individuals unless diverse representatives, from various states of the union, have managed to 
agree on the details
64. Despite these concerns of legitimacy, the US Supreme Court has 
consistently approved acts of Congress that have delegated broad regulatory powers to 
agencies. However, the Court has acknowledged the implicit constitutional requirements of 
consensual government under law by stipulating that a constitutional exercise of 
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  19congressionally delegated powers requires Congress to ‘lay down by legislative act an 
‘intelligible principle’ to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform’
65.  
 
3.5.  The non-delegation doctrine:  Supreme Court case law 
 
The next sections discusses two cases that illustrate how the US Supreme Court deals with the 
delegation problem and how the court has reconciled this phenomenon with the Constitution.  
It is important to note that these cases are of relevance for the delegation of powers to both 
the executive and the independent agencies.      
 
The first case Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc
66, concerns the delegation of 
broad regulatory powers to EPA by virtue of the Clean Air Act. The Clean Air Act requires 
EPA to promulgate and periodically revise National Ambient Air Quality standards 
(“NAAQS”) for each air pollutant identified by the agency as meeting certain statutory 
criteria. Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA instructs EPA to set NAAQS the attainment and the 
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, are  “requisite to protect the public health”.  
 
EPA issued final rules revising the primary and secondary NAAQS for particulate matter 
(‘PM’) and ozone in July 1997. Numerous petitions for review have been filed for each rule. 
EPA regarded ozone definitely, and PM likely, as non-threshold pollutants, i.e. ones that have 
some possibility of some adverse health impact (however slight) at any exposure level above 
zero. This means that the only concentration for ozone and PM that is utterly risk free, in the 
sense of direct health impacts, is zero. However, the EPA did not set the permitted 
concentration level at zero, instead it set the level at 0.08 ppm level for ozone. EPA explained 
that its choice is superior to retaining the existing level, 0.09 ppm, because more people are 
exposed to more serious effects at 0.09 than at 0.08. In defending the decision not to go down 
to 0.07 EPA never rebutted the intuitive proposition, confirmed by data in its staff paper, that 
reducing the standard further than 0.08 would bring about comparable changes.  
 
The Court of Appeals found that EPA did not satisfactorily explain the level of residual risk 
admitted by picking any non-zero level
67. The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that EPA 
failed to provide any determinate criterion for drawing lines. It had failed to state intelligibly 
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  20‘how much is too much’. Although, the Court of Appeals found the statutory language of the 
Clean Air Act involved a unconstitutional delegation of power, it was of the opinion the EPA 
could remedy this constitutional weakness by giving a determinate standard for the 
interpretation of the statute. So its response to the unconstitutional delegation of power would 
not be to strike down the statute, but to give the agency the opportunity to formulate clear 
standards that would restrict the exercise of its powers. Since the Court of Appeals found 
EPA did not provide any clear standards, it declared its rules unconstitutional. The US 
Supreme Court did not approve the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the EPA’s interpretation 
(but not the statute itself) violated the non-delegation doctrine:   
 
“In a delegation challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated 
legislative power to the agency. Article I, paragraph I, of the Constitution vests “all 
legislative Powers herein granted … in a Congress of the United States.” This text permits no 
delegation of those powers, and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers 
decision-making authority upon agencies Congress must “lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. We 
have never suggested that an agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by 
adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute…The idea that an agency can 
cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of 
that power seems to us internally contradictory. The very choice of which portion of the power 
to exercise-that is to say the prescription of the standard that Congress has omitted –would 
itself be an exercise of the forbidden legislative authority. Whether the statute delegated 
legislative power is a question for the courts, and an agency’s voluntary self-denial has no 
bearing upon the answer.  
 
The scope of discretion the CAA allows is in fact well within the outer limits of our non-
delegation precedents…  
(Congress) must provide substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire 
economy. But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded, as the Court of 
Appeals did there, that statutes provide a “determinate criterion” for saying “how much (of 
the regulated harm) is too much”.  
 
Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA, which to repeat we interpret as requiring the EPA to set 
NAAQS at the level that is “requisite”-that is no lower or higher than is necessary- to protect 
the public health with an adequate margin of safety, fits comfortably within the scope of 
discretion permitted by our precedent”.   
 
Three important conclusions can be drawn from this opinion. Firstly, the US Supreme Court 
rejected the interpretation of the non-delegation doctrine put forward by the Court of Appeals, 
  21according to which an agency could save a statute from unconstitutionality by limiting its 
own discretion through statutory interpretation. This interpretation interferes, indeed, with one 
of the fundamental points of the non-delegation doctrine, namely to ensure legislative rather 
than administrative judgements about the contents of federal law. The interpretation of the 
Court of Appeals would convert the non-delegation doctrine into something else, namely a 
general requirement of administrative transparency, a requirement with no obvious 
constitutional foundation and not in harmony with Article I
68.   
 
Secondly, the Supreme Court approved that Congress had delegated broad regulating powers 
to EPA. By virtue of these powers EPA may create new duties for a category of polluters. 
Moreover, the Court accepted that Congress had referred the making of important policy 
decisions as regards the permitted level of air pollution to the administrative agency. The 
substance of the CAA is meagre and merely requires EPA to take the measures “that are 
requisite to protect health”.  However, for most pollutants, air quality at various levels is not 
‘either safe’ or ‘not safe’ for there are diminishing degrees of risks associated with 
diminishing degrees of exposure. EPA should determine on what basis a particular level of 
residual risk is appropriate and it should formulate the ingredients of any judgements that a 
certain risk is too high
69. EPA’s decision will be based on a series of scientific, political, and 
economic judgements and compromises.  
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  22Thirdly, it seems that the Supreme Court has followed a formal approach to the Separation of 
Powers doctrine by designating the agency’s powers as ‘not legislative’ but rather executive. 
The application of the Separation of Powers doctrine in Whitman looks artificial for the effect 
of the agency’s rules will be comparable with the effect of acts of Congress. If the Court had 
applied a functional approach to the Separation of Powers principle, it would have achieved 
the same result. This is also acknowledged by Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter 
joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgement. He states that it would be both 
wiser and more faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that 
agency rulemaking authority is ‘legislative power’. In the opinion of the concurring judge, it 
seems clear that an executive agency’s exercise of rulemaking authority pursuant to a valid 
delegation from Congress is legislative. He notes, that as long as the delegation provides a 
sufficient intelligible principle, there is nothing inherently unconstitutional about it. 
 
3.5.1. The delegation of accumulated powers   
 
The opinion of the Supreme Court in Mistretta v. United States
70 indicates it is legitimate for 
Congress to delegate to independent agencies accumulated powers that are originally vested 
in the President, Congress or the Judiciary.   
 
In  Mistretta the Court upheld the constitutionality of the independent United States 
Sentencing Commission, a body composed of seven members, statutorily located in the 
judicial branch. The Commission had the legal power to write sentencing guidelines that are 
binding on federal judges who sentence criminal defendants. Congress wrote fairly detailed 
standards in the statute. The Court held the delegation of power did not violate the non-
delegation doctrine and based the ruling on a functional Separation of Powers approach. The 
Court stated that in having adopted a flexible understanding of the Separation of Powers 
principle before, it has recognized the teaching of the Framers of the Constitution that the 
greatest security against tyranny, does not lie in a hermetic division between the Branches, 
but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch. In the 
view of the Court, Congress’ decision to create an independent rulemaking body to 
promulgate sentencing guidelines and to locate that body within the Judicial Branch, is not 
unconstitutional, unless Congress has vested in the Commission powers that are more 
appropriately performed by the other Branches or that undermine the integrity of the 
Judiciary. The Court thinks it is consistent with the Separation of Powers principle that 
Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch non-adjudicatory functions that do not tread 
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  23upon the Prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of the 
judiciary. 
 
The opinion makes clear that the Court accepts it to be legitimate that independent members 
of the Federal judiciary are involved in rulemaking. Therefore, this opinion confirms the 
power of Congress to delegate rulemaking powers to independent agencies that are to some 
extent independent from the President. Moreover, in the light of Court’s reasoning in 
Mistretta, there are good reasons to believe the Court has approved the accumulation of 
different functions within an administrative agency, on the condition that the prerogatives of 
each of the Branches are respected and the combination of these functions are central to the 
mission of the agency.  
 
3.6. A Functional approach to the Separation of Powers doctrine: maintaining the 
checks and balances  (question 7) 
 
It follows that the US Supreme Court is of the opinion that neither the text nor the history of 
the Constitution forbid Congress to create institutions (independent agencies) and legislative 
arrangements (delegation) that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. The Court has 
realised it should give Congress enough space to adapt governmental structure to changing 
circumstances and policies.  
 
Although the US Supreme Court has followed a quite formal approach to the principle of the 
Separation of Powers in some cases, like in Bowsher and Whitman, the opinion would have 
been the same in those cases in case the Supreme Court had followed a more functional 
approach: An approach in which it would have examined whether the ‘checks and balances’ 
between Congress, the President and the Judiciary were maintained.   
 
Professor Strauss is a leading advocate of the functional approach to the Separation of Powers 
principle, which is well established in US legal doctrine and case law by now
71.  This 
functional approach recognizes that each of the three branches is the ultimate authority for a 
distinctive governmental authority type (legislate, executive of judicial). However, the 
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  24functional approach does not require administrative government below the apex to be strictly 
divided in three parts. In assessing Congressional arrangements the important question should 
be whether the relationships of each of the three named actors of the Constitution to the 
exercise of their powers is such as to promise a continuation of their effective independence 
and interdependence. Every Congressional arrangement can be approved as long as adequate 
checks and balances between the three branches are maintained and they can effectively 
exercise their core functions in controlling agencies and the exercise of their powers.  
 
A functional approach to the Separation of Powers principle makes the differences between 
the independent agencies and other agencies less important. Each such agency is to some 
extent independent of the three named branches and to some extent in relationship with each 
of them. The continued achievement of the intended balance and interaction among the three 
named actors at the top of government, with each continuing to have effective responsibility 
for its unique core function, depends on the existence of relationships between each of these 
actors and each agency within which that function can find voice
72. Both executive and 
independent agencies adopt rules, execute laws and adjudicate cases all pursuant to statutory 
authority. This conjoining of powers does not violate the Separation of Powers model since 
from a functional perspective the important fact is an agency is neither Congress nor 
President nor Court, but an inferior part of government. Each agency is subject to control 
relationships with some or all of the three constitutionally-named branches, and those 
relationship give assurance -functionally similar to that provided by the Separation of Powers 
notion for the constitutionally named bodies- that they will not pass out of control
73.  
 
After having described that the US governmental structure as it exists today may well be 
reconciled with the Separation of Powers principle of the Constitution, the following 
paragraphs will analyse more deeply how the ‘checks and balances’ between the powers of 
the President, Congress and the Judiciary in controlling the actions of (independent) agencies 
are maintained in practice. In addition, they will look into how the participation of the public 
in administrative procedures forms a check upon the exercise of powers by the agencies.  
 
4.  Accountability (questions  2, 3, 9,  15, 18, 19) 
 
4.1. Introduction  (question 10) 
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  25Although independent agencies are to some extent independent from politics, this paragraph 
discusses that both Congress and the President have many instruments to control the agencies’ 
actions. Agencies are accountable to Congress and the President, in that they should explain 
and account for their decisions to both institutions. Therefore, the citizens can control the 
agencies’ actions through their representatives in Congress and through the President. Indirect 
political control by the electorate is not the only way to confer legitimacy upon the exercise of 
public powers. The following paragraphs will illustrate that in addition to representative 
democracy, participative democracy, meaning that interested parties have the right to 
participate in the agencies’ administrative procedures, will contribute to the legitimisation of 
the agencies’ actions.   
 
4.2. Accountability: Congressional oversight (question 4) 
 
4.2.1.  Overview 
 
Congress has a variety of means at its disposal to control agency action. Indeed, the most 
direct way for Congress to control the substance of the rulemaking process is to specify the 
degree of the agency’s authority. When agencies formulate rules Congress doesn’t like, 
agency decisions can be overruled by passing legislation or they can be rendered moot by the 
changing of the agency’s jurisdiction
74. However, it will be difficult for Congress to form an 
effective check on agencies activities through the formal legislative process, since this process 
is very heavy.  
 
Congress can also influence agency’s actions by placing restrictions on the appropriated 
funds. Moreover, Congress has tried to change the powers of agencies through appropriations 
bills in the past. Of particular importance was an appropriations bill containing provisions to 
limit the power of the EPA. Eventually, because of the threat of a presidential veto and 
controversies within Congress the proposals were not adopted
75.   
 
Congress can also shape administrative decisions indirectly by applying political pressure 
through the use of committee reports, through budgetary, oversight or investigatory hearings 
and hearings on the nominations of administrators and through direct communications with 
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  26administrators
76. The effectiveness of this last group of controls can be increased by requiring 
that agencies report to Congress before they act, by utilizing the General Accounting Office to 
investigate agency conduct and by employing the Congressional Budget Office to consider 
the economic effects of government programs.  
 
4.2.2. How effective is congressional oversight? 
 
Although it is proved that political oversight techniques are able to influence the agency 
work
77, the possibility of Congress threatening to use legislative sanctions, however, does not 
empower Congress to control the bureaucracy
78.  
 
Professor Kagan acknowledges the limits of Congress’s ability to impose harsh sanctions. 
Statutory punishments require the action of full Congress, which is difficult and costly to 
accomplish. In order to impose sanctions, Congress has to go through the formal legislative 
process, meaning majority support is not enough: it must gain the approval of either the 
President or two-thirds of both houses. Moreover, Kagan is concerned about Congress 
influencing agency behaviour for two reasons. The first reason relates to the identity of the 
parties most engaged in Congress’s oversight system. The fire-alarm system usually goes off 
in the committee and subcommittee rooms of Congress and not on the floors of the House or 
Senate. Usually these committees are comprised of legislators whose constituents have a 
special interest in its jurisdiction and these legislators tend to develop strong ties to these 
organized interest groups that sound the fire alarms. In the view of Kagan, the administrative 
policy set by these players rarely will reflect the preferences of Congress as a whole or the 
general public. The second aspect of concern of congressional control lies in its reactive 
nature. Mostly Congress will come into action in response to outside complaints. These 
complaints will usually arise from a change in policy and not from the status quo. The result 
is that congressional oversight will tend to have a conservative quality. Moreover, these 
complaints will often be presented as an isolated problem, whereas they form part of broader 
regulatory issues. Therefore, Kagan concludes that complaint driven nature of congressional 
oversight, especially in combination with its reliance on committees, pushes toward the ad 
hoc rather than the systematic consideration of administrative policy.  
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  27Like Kagan, Sunstein is sceptical of Congress’s ability to reform administrative policy. He 
argues that the election of the 104
th Congress signalled the transformation of America into a 
genuinely post New Deal regulatory state
79. The Acts that were adopted during the New Deal 
were criticised for not comprising any mechanisms to evaluate regulatory performance. There 
was consensus on the following problems in existing government regulation: bad priority 
setting; government should favour flexible, market-based incentives rather than rigid 
command; government should recognize and counteract harmful intended consequences of 
regulations; government needs more information and should create better incentives to 
compile and provide accurate information; government should respond to both expert and 
citizen judgments in regulating risks; government should concentrate on basic ends rather 
than the means and should use performance standards rather than design standards. Congress 
tried to reform the administrative state by proposing several bills that challenged the basic 
foundations of the New Deal acts. In the regulatory arena cost-benefit balancing dominated 
the debate.  
 
On 22 March 1995 Congress enacted the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
80. This Act 
contains two provisions that are interesting from the perspective of regulatory reform. First, 
the Act requires that a statement containing a “qualitative and quantitative assessment of the 
anticipated costs and benefits of the Federal mandate” accompany significant regulatory 
action. This provision is largely procedural and does not make much of a difference
81. 
Presidential Executive Orders on Federal regulation impose nearly identical requirements. 
The second provision is more ambitious and requires that agencies “identify and consider a 
reasonable number of regulatory alternatives and from those alternatives select the least 
costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that achieves the objectives of the 
rule”. The Act exempts agencies from these requirements if compliance would be inconsistent 
with the law or if the agency explains its reason for not selecting the least burdensome 
alternative. Despite the fact that the Act does not apply if other statutes prohibit from 
following it, it encourages agencies to choose cheaper ways of achieving regulatory goals. 
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  28According to Sunstein, these two provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act offer 
cautious steps in the direction of general requirement of cost-benefit balancing
82.  
 
In 1996 Congress enacted another Act strengthening Congress’s role in reviewing agency 
rules. This Congressional Review Act requires agencies to submit all regulations to Congress 
and gives Congress an opportunity to ‘veto’ any rule through the formal process of 
lawmaking
83. The effect of this procedure should not be overestimated. Before the adoption of 
the Act Congress already had the power to cancel a rule if it could get the President’s 
concurrence (or override a presidential veto). Moreover, Congress is unlikely to get the 
presidential approval very often, since the President will defend agency rules most of the 
time
84.   
 
Sunstein concludes that Congress might be ill-equipped to attempt major reform, at least if it 
does a great deal at the micro level
85. Legislators are generalists and not specialists, and they 
have many issues to address. According to Sunstein such a group of generalists is prone to 
sharp internal divisions that are not subject to reasonable mediation without a good deal of 
specialization in regulation. These claims about the institutional capacities are reinforced by 
the way Congress has been split between two different sets of interests: technocratic forces 
seeking to discipline agency decisions with better policy analysis and forces of reaction 
seeking to stop agency action even when it would improve social well-being. From this 
perspective, Sunstein argues that the executive branch has a major advantage as it can more 
easily use specialized experience
86. For this reason it may be best for Congress to limit its 
efforts to providing broad signals about what is wrong and to allow the executive branch, 
within limits, to provide solutions. Although Sunstein thinks Congress should restrict itself to 
providing broad signals, he argues Congress can improve the quality of legislation by laying 
down clearer standards and giving more guidance to the agencies on which factors they 
should take into account in making rules. For instance, he argues that Congress should amend 
the Clean Air Act to identify the factors for EPA to consider in making the judgement about 
appropriate national standards. Congress might offer substantive guidance by saying, for 
example, that EPA must consider risk severity, size of affected population and likelihood of 
adverse effects at various exposure levels. On the procedural side, it might require EPA to 
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  29identify, to the extent possible, the nature of the risks that it is reducing, and at the same time 
to quantify the relevant risk reductions
87.  
 
Indeed, Presidents have been more successful in reviewing agency rules on their compliance 
with cost-benefit and cost-effective principles. The following paragraph discusses and 
evaluates the techniques the President has at his disposal to influence the agencies’ actions.   
 
5. Accountability: presidential oversight (questions 2,3) 
 
5.1.  Overview 
 
As discussed in paragraph 2 the President has several instruments at his disposal to manage 
government and to control the exercise of discretionary powers. An important instrument for 
the President to control the actions of the administrative agencies is the President’s 
responsibility to present the budget. All but a few administrative agencies must have their 
budgets approved by the President’s policy-coordinating agent, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB). The process of budget approval gives the President the opportunity to 
review agency performance and establish program priorities. Since the enforcement of 
statutory responsibilities is tied to funding, the budget process gives the OMB a chance to 
emphasize priorities of the President that may or may not be instinctively shared by the 
agencies
88.  The budget process has an important impact on regulatory agencies since the 
Reagan administration
89. The Reagan administration used its control over the budget of 
administrative agencies as part of an overall strategy to deregulate the economy and reduce 
the deficit. The Clinton administration utilized its control on the agencies’ budget to eliminate 
the deficit. OMB plays an important role in reviewing and influencing the substance of 
proposed agency’s rules. By virtue of the ‘Take care duty’ President Reagan was the first to 
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  305.2.  Era of presidential administration 
 
By virtue of Executive Order 12, 291
91 agencies were required to submit to OMB’s Office of 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for prepublication review any proposed major rule, accompanied 
by a  ‘regulatory impact analysis’ of the rule, including a cost-benefit comparison. The order 
also contained substantial requirements for the agency’s rules. “To the extent permitted by the 
law” an agency could regulate only if the benefits of regulating exceeded the costs and the 
choice among alternatives involved the “least net cost to society”. Although the Order 
disclaimed any right on OMB or the President himself to dictate or displace agency decisions, 
the Order gave OMB a form of substantial control over rulemaking for under the Order OMB 
had the authority to determine the adequacy of an impact analysis. Moreover, OMB could 
prevent the publication of a proposed or final rule, even indefinitely, until the completion of 
the review procedure
92.  Executive Order 12498
93 added a mandate that each agency submit 
for OMB Review an annual regulatory plan listing proposed actions for the year. 
Consequently OMB got an earlier opportunity to influence agency rulemakings.  
 
In the opinion of Kagan, the Orders provided in practice more consequences than any prior 
review system and enabled President Reagan to influence the agencies regulatory policies 
substantially. Whereas during the Bush era the strengthened role of the Presidency in 
reviewing agencies rules was maintained, presidential control of administration expanded 
significantly during the Clinton Presidency.  It is important to note President Clinton issued 
Order 12,866
94 to replace Orders 12,291 and 12,498. The new Order confirmed that cost-
benefit analysis and cost-effectiveness, to the extent permitted by the relevant statute, 
continued to serve as the basic principles for the assessment of regulatory decisions. An 
important innovation of the new Order is that independent agencies are subjected to the 
regulatory planning process. This provision enabled the OMB to request ‘further 
consideration’ of proposed rules that appeared in conflict with other agency action, the 
Order’s regulatory principles or the President’s priorities.  
 
In the view of Kagan, President’s Clinton’s principal innovation in the effort to influence 
administrative action lay in initiating a regular practice of issuing formal directives to 
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  31executive branch officials regarding the exercise of their statutory discretion
95. For instance, 
on 10 August 1995 President Clinton began a press conference announcing publication of a 
proposed rule to reduce youth smoking. He stated he would restrict by executive authority the 
advertisement, promotion, distribution and marketing of cigarettes to teenagers and he would 
authorize the Food and Drug Administration to initiate a broad series of steps all designed to 
stop sales and marketing of cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to children.  The final versions 
of the rules eventually adopted by FDA reflected the heart of the proposals made by the 
President.  
 
Kagan analyses the factors that contributed to Clinton’s turn towards administration as a 
means of realizing his domestic policy ambitions
96. Some of these factors have a more 
structural aspect, reflecting long-term trends that are likely to appear to other Presidents as 
well. She points to the trend that the American public has high and rising expectations about 
what a President should be able to accomplish. The public demands of the achievements of 
the President is strengthened by modern press, which makes insatiable demands and places 
impossible pressures on the office of the President. For these reasons, the pressure on the 
President to demonstrate action, leadership and accomplishment has grown. Yet the 
possibility of any significant legislative accomplishment has grown dim in an era of divided 
government with high polarization between Congressional parties. According to Kagan, 
given, these changes, it is not surprising that a President would turn to administration:  a 
sphere in which he unilaterally can take decisive action. These factors also make it likely that 
other Presidents will continue Clinton’s practices.  
 
President’s Clinton’s assertion of directive authority over administration raises, unlike the 
procedural oversight power exercised under OMB review
97, constitutional questions. No 
Supreme Court case specifically addresses the question whether the President has the power 
to direct the executive agencies in exercising their discretionary powers. However, the 
conventional view is that by virtue of Separation of Powers arguments, implying that 
Congress must authorize presidential exercises of essentially lawmaking functions, the 
President does not have this power when Congress has only delegated discretionary powers to 
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  32executive branch officials
98. Conversely Kagan argues the President, indeed, has the power to 
direct policy decisions of executive agencies (not of independent agencies)
99.  
 
Whether or not Bill Clinton’s directions were constitutional, Kagan’s article illustrates very 
well the growing role of the President in managing the administrative state. The increasing 
role of the President is an inevitable consequence of the growth of the activities of 
administrative agencies making the coordination of their actions necessary. By virtue of a 
mandate from the electorate the President can ensure that inconsistencies and redundancies in 
regulation are resolved. These developments do no have to threaten the balance of power 
between the three named branches. Indeed, Congress keeps the power to shape the delegated 
powers and might as a response to growing presidential administration even restrict the scope 
of delegated powers. However, this would not mean that Congress should stop delegating 
broad regulatory powers. Instead, as said before, Sunstein argues Congress should improve 
the quality of legislation, for instance by giving more guidance to the agency on how to 
characterise the cost and benefits of regulatory action and on how to value those costs and 
benefits
100.  Furthermore, the courts continue to review the agency’s actions, since 
presidential direction does not insulate the agency’s actions from judicial review. However, 
increasing presidential involvement may stimulate courts to take a more deferential approach 
to policy choices being made by the agencies. Paragraph 7 will discuss this topic. The 
following paragraph discusses how interest groups might influence the decisions of agencies.  
 
6. Accountability: Public participation  (question 15) 
 
6.1. Introduction  
 
Procedural safeguards are important in enhancing the political and public accountability of 
agencies. Procedural safeguards make the reasoning and the factual predictions of agency 
decisions transparent enabling Congress, the President and the Judiciary to review whether 
the agency has acted within statutory limits and in a reasonable manner. Moreover, procedural 
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  33safeguards give an opportunity to interested parties to state their views on the proposed rules 
enabling the agency to take account of their interests.  
 
There are five potential sources of procedural requirements that agencies must follow; agency 
rules, the Constitution (Due Process Clause), statutes, Executive orders and the common 
law
101. Since, statutes are the dominant source of the procedures agencies must follow, this 
paragraph will only deal with the statutory procedural requirements. Two statutory sources 
are of relevance for the determination of which procedures the agency must follow, namely 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
102 and the organic legislation that authorizes the 
agency to take the action under consideration. The APA was enacted in response to criticism 
of the bad procedural safeguards in the organic acts. The stipulations of those acts were 
inadequate to protect the private parties affected by agency actions from deprivation of their 
rights and to ensure that the agencies’ actions were in the public interest. Furthermore, the 
lack of uniformity in federal agency decision-making procedures, made it difficult for parties 
to participate effectively in agency proceedings because they often could not predict in 
advance the procedures an agency would use to make a particular decision
103.   
 
The APA comprises four procedures, i.e. two procedures that relate to the agencies 
adjudicatory powers and two procedures that relate to the agencies’ rulemaking powers. The 
APA, however, does not direct the agency as to which procedure it should follow. The APA 
refers to the provisions of the agency’s organic act as the basis for the determination which of 
the APA procedures the agency is required to use in taking particular type of actions. It is 
important to note that the APA applies to the activities of the executive as well to those of the 
independent agencies.  
 
6.2. Distinction between adjudication and rulemaking 
 
Two old US Supreme Cases are important for analysing the distinction between adjudication 
and rulemaking. In these cases the Supreme Court had to determine whether The Due Process 
Clause was violated. By virtue of this clause  “No person shall… be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law” (XIV Amendment). The Due Process Clause only 
applies to the protected interests of individuals and does not protect the interests of a group of 
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  34people. In Londoner v. Denver
104 the US Supreme Court considered whether the City could 
assess and levy a special tax against individual property owners to cover the costs of paving a 
public street on which their property fronted, without affording the property owners any 
opportunity to be heard. The Court was of the opinion that the city had violated the Due 
Process clause. It put the following reasons forward:    
 
“where the legislature of a State, instead of fixing the tax itself, commits to some 
subordinate the duty of determining whether, in what amount and upon whom it shall 
be levied, and of making its assessment and apportionment, due process of law 
requires that at some stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably 
fixed, the taxpayer shall have an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have 
notice…..” 
 
In Bi-Metallic Investment Co the US Supreme Court
105 pointed out under what conditions acts 
of government do not come within the requirements of the Due Process Clause. Unlike 
Londoner, this case did not concern the levy of specific taxes on individuals, but an order of 
the City board increasing the valuation of all taxable property in Denver. In the opinion of the 
Court it would be impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in the adoption of a 
rule that applies to more than a few people. The rights of the affected people are protected by 
their power, immediate or remote over those who make the rule. The Court denied the 
constitutional right of an individual to be heard before the adoption of a general measure. It 
distinguished Bi-Metallic from Londoner by pointing out that in the latter case: 
 
“A relatively small number of persons was concerned, who were exceptionally 
affected, in each case upon individual grounds…” 
 
According to Pierce, the distinction announced in Londoner and Bi-metallic lies at the core of 
administrative procedure. It is the basis for the modern relationship between agency rules and 
agency adjudication, and they remain crucial to legislative and judicial determinations of the 
types of procedural safeguards that should be required in various administrative decision-
making contexts
106.  Pierce is of the opinion that the number of people affected or potentially 
affected is the dominant factor in determining whether the Due Process Clause applies at all 
to an agency action that affects protected interests.  
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  35With regard to the above, it can be concluded that adjudication, in general, concerns the 
determination of individual rights and duties in the application of a general rule, whereas 
rulemaking comprises the formulation of norms of general applicability and future effect. 
This distinction is also reflected in APA Section 551 (5)-(9) that defines adjudication and 
rulemaking for the purposes of the APA
107.  In general the APA imposes, in harmony with the 
Due Process Clause, stricter procedural requirements in the exercise of adjudicatory than in 
rulemaking powers.   
 
6.3.  Adjudication 
 
6.3.1. Formal adjudication 
 
An agency is required to use the APA formal adjudication procedure when Congress has 
directed it to do so. By virtue of Section 554 APA the formal adjudication procedure is 
required when the organic statute stipulates that the adjudication should be determined “on 
the record after opportunity for an agency hearing”. But even when statutes lack these words, 
courts tend to interpret the statute as providing for a hearing on the record in cases where the 
agency is imposing a sanction or liability on a party. In this way, the Courts can ensure the 
statutes are interpreted in harmony with the Due Process Clause
108.  
 
The formal adjudication procedure is regulated in Sections 554, 556 en 557 APA. Together 
these sections create a procedure that resembles a civil trial procedure. The persons entitled to 
a hearing shall be timely informed of the time, place and the nature of the hearings, the legal 
authority and jurisdiction under which the hearing is to be held and the matters of fact and law 
asserted. Interested or affected third parties may be entitled to intervene in the proceeding
109. 
A party is entitled to present his case or defense by oral or documentary evidence, to submit 
rebuttal evidence, and to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and 
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  36true disclosure of the facts. The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers 
and requests filed in the proceeding, constitutes the exclusive record for decision.  
 
It is interesting to note these formal adjudication procedures often are presided over by an 
independent Administrative Law Judge  (ALJ). This ALJ rules on offers of proof and receives 
relevant evidence, regulates the course of the hearing and may make or recommend the 
decisions. When the ALJ makes an initial decision that decision then becomes the decision of 
the agency without further proceedings, unless there is an appeal to the agency or the agency 
elects on its own motion to review the decision.  
 
The Administrative Law Judges are almost entirely independent of the agencies at which they 
preside. The Office of Personnel Management of the President determines their pay, 
independently of any evaluations or recommendations made by the agency
110. An agency can 
only take an action against an ALJ for good cause to be established and determined by 
another agency on the record after opportunity for hearing
111. Another important feature of the 
ALJ is that he cannot be subject to supervision or direction by an agency employee with 
investigative or prosecutorial functions
112. Moreover, stipulations are included that guarantee 
the AJL shall not have any ex parte communications on the merits of the proceedings with 
interested persons outside of the agency
113.   
 
The idea of the drafters of the APA was to give the ALJs independence for whom they 
worked, and to provide public evidence that factual determinations were being made by 
independent officials. But the agency, on review of the ALJ’s decision, was free to apply its 
policy to the facts found by independent officials
114.  
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  37Since this ALJ operates rather independently from the agency, he or she plays an important 
role in ensuring procedural fairness and impartial decision-making. Moreover, the internal 
division between fact finding and policy making, may remedy the negative effects of the 
conjoining of different powers in one agency.  
 
6.3.2. Informal adjudication  
 
About ninety percent of all agency decisions are made through informal adjudication. 
Therefore, it is remarkable that APA hardly deals with this category of procedures. In 
instances where a relevant statute does not require the adjudicatory decision to be made “on 
the record after opportunity for agency hearing”, the APA provides little procedural 
requirements. Section 555 APA only provides that: 
-A person compelled to appear in person before an agency or representative is entitled to legal 
counsel;  
-A party can obtain a copy of any data or evidence she provides;  
-A party is entitled to a brief statement of the grounds for denying any written petition.  
In addition Due Process can be the source of judicially imposed procedural safeguards if the 
agency’s action adversely affects an individual’s interest in life, liberty or property
115. 
However, the procedural safeguards mandated by Due Process vary substantially on the 
specific circumstances of the case at issue
116. Therefore, Pierce argues the APA should be 
amended to include minimal procedural safeguards for informal adjudication. This would 
help the agencies in determining which procedures are appropriate for informal adjudication 
and would eliminate the need for agencies and the courts to attempt the difficult task of 
determining procedures appropriate for hundreds of types of adjudications through ad hoc 
application of the Due Process Clause.   
 
6.4. Informal rulemaking 
 
6.4.1. Informal or formal rulemaking 
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  38When an agency chooses to take an action through rulemaking it has to make a choice 
whether it takes action trough informal or formal rulemaking. Formal rulemaking is much like 
a trial type proceeding, which includes the taking of testimony and cross-examination and 
decision making on the basis of the evidence presented. Therefore, formal rulemaking is a 
very time-consuming procedure. The order of the Supreme Court in United States v. Florida 
East Coast Railway was an enormous impulse for agencies to shift from adjudication to 
informal rulemaking to develop law and policy
117. In this case the US Supreme Court, 
apparently aware of the delays and other dysfunctions attributed to formal rulemaking, 
confirmed that agencies were obliged to follow formal rulemaking procedures only when 




6.4.2. The notice and comment procedure 
 
As a consequence of Florida East Coast most of the rulemaking happens through the ‘notice 
and comment procedure’. The process of informal rulemaking is regulated by section 553 
APA and consists of three steps. Firstly, a general notice of the proposed rulemaking shall be 
published in the Federal Register. This general notice shall include, a statement of the time, 
place and nature of the public rulemaking proceedings, a reference to the legal authority under 
which the rule is proposed and either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and the issues involved.  Secondly, after the agency has given 
notice it shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking through 
submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without the opportunity for oral 
presentation. Thirdly, after the agency has considered the relevant matter presented, the 
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a  ‘concise general statement of their basis and 
purpose’.  
 
The basic notice and comment model of the APA seems rather simple and does not seem to 
impose too many procedural constraints on the agencies. However, the circuit courts have 
interpreted the provisions of the APA in a way that turned the informal procedures into new 
‘paper hearing’ procedures
119. The Novia Scotia case
120 decided by the 2d Cir Court illustrates 
very well the way federal appellate courts have transformed the notice and comment 
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  39procedure into a more elaborate paper hearing process that generates a documentary record 
and full agency opinion as the basis for judicial review
121.  
 
As regards the substance of the administrative record the Court ruled: 
“If the failure to notify interested parties of the scientific research upon which the 
agency was relying actually prevented the presentation of relevant comment, the 
agency may be held not to have considered all “the relevant factors”. To suppress 
meaningful comment by failure to disclose the basic data relied upon is akin to 
rejecting comment altogether”.   
 
As regards the obligation to formulate a ‘concise general statement’ the Court ruled: 
“ Appellants additionally attack the “concise and general statement” required by 
section 553 APA as inadequate. We think in the circumstances, it was less than 
adequate. It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised 
by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered. The agencies 
certainly have a good deal of discretion in expressing the basis of a rule, but the 
agencies do not have quite the prerogatives of obscurantism reserved to 
legislatures”. 
 
As a result of cases like Novia Scotia the agencies should publish in its public notice the 
factual and scientific basis of a proposed rule. It would indeed be impossible for the public to 
deliver high quality comments on a proposed rule when such data is not included in the 
notice. By imposing the requirement to include scientific and factual data the courts have 
prevented formal rulemaking procedures from becoming useless.  Another consequence of 
Novia Scotia is that the agencies should explain in the preambular statement accompanying a 
final rule their grounds for the decision, including their reasons for rejecting adverse outside 




The procedural requirements that were imposed by the courts have posed heavy burdens on 
the administrative process resulting in the so-called ‘ossification’ of the administrative 
process. The ossification of the administrative process became worse, because some courts 
went beyond the requirements of detailed explanation and a ‘paper hearing’ by requiring a 
limited trial-type hearing in notice and comments procedures.  Excessive judicial review has 
slowed the pace of rulemaking at all agencies. Promulgation of a single major rule often 
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  40requires five to ten years and tens of thousands of agency staff hours, with only a 50 percent 
probability of judicial affirmation of the resulting rule
123. Consequently, instead of using the 
rulemaking process, the agencies issued interpretative rules or policy statements that are not 
subject to the notice and comment procedure.    
 
The Supreme Court seems to have recognized the adverse effect of excessively demanding 
judicial review on the rulemaking process. In this respect the opinion in Vermont Yankee
124 is 
of great importance, since it put a halt on the development of further judicial requirements 
going beyond  ‘paper hearing’ rulemaking. In this opinion the Court states agencies are free to 
grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are 
not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them. Although this opinion 
to some extent relieves the administrative burdens of some agencies, the remaining 
requirements of keeping an adequate administrative record and providing adequate 
justification still generate an enormous amount of work for the agencies. Therefore, various 
proposals have been made to improve administrative procedures. One suggestion is to relax 
the demand for extensive records and elaborate agencies’ explanations and hard-look judicial 
review
125. Other suggestions are referral of major rules to Congress for adoption through 
‘fast-track legislation’, bypassing judicial review in favour of direct political control, or 
greater reliance on executive oversight and control of rulemaking.  
 
7. Accountability:  Judicial review (Questions 9, 18, 19)   
 
7.1. Introduction    
 
Affected parties have a constitutional right to judicial review if an agency action arguably 
infringes a constitutional right. However, the issue of whether a party has a constitutional 
right to judicial review of an agency action arises infrequently, because the legislature usually 
provides an explicit statutory right to judicial review
126. Congress usually has provided that 
final agency actions are subject to judicial review in accordance with the provisions of the 
APA.  
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person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by 
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof”. 
The US Supreme Court applies a two-part test to analyse whether a party has standing
127. At 
first, the question has to be answered whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action 
has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise. Secondly, the question has to be 
answered whether the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interests 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. This first part of 
the standing test is based on the requirements of Article III of the Constitution, that limits the 
powers of the Federal courts to the resolution of  “cases and controversies”. The second part 
of the standing test recognizes that, to the extent permitted by the Constitution, it is up to 
Congress to decide which parties have the power to obtain judicial review of an agency 
action. In theory the two part standing test may seem clear. However, both the US Supreme 
Court and the lower courts have applied it in different ways for many different purposes, 
producing seemingly inconsistent results
128.  
 
7.2. Scope of judicial review of the agencies’ statements of reasons and facts  
 
Since the APA usually is determinant for the judicial scope of review, both the independent 
and the executive agencies’ actions are reviewed under the same standards. Pursuant to 
section 706 APA the reviewing courts shall determine whether the agencies’ findings of facts 
and reasons are “arbitrary and capricious” and whether the action is not in accordance with 
the law. In case the agency decision is taken on the record after opportunity for hearing, the 
agencies statement of reasons and facts will be reviewed under the more strict “substantial 
evidence test”. The original version of the “arbitrary and capricious” test for the review of the 
agencies’ findings of facts and reasons was quite deferential to the agencies’ findings. 
However, since courts have been imposing stricter procedural requirements on the agencies 
when acting through the notice and comment procedure, they have been scrutinizing the 
agencies’ statement of facts and reasons more thoroughly. Therefore, it seems the “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard and the “substantial evidence” tests have converged.  
 
While the Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee has put a halt on courts taking a hard look on 
the procedures that agencies should institute for taking their actions, it has not yet addressed 
in a definitive way to what extent the reviewing courts should engage in a detailed scrutiny of 
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heavily debated in the USA at this moment. The debate focuses on the question whether or 
not a substantive ‘hard-look doctrine’ should be accepted. Pursuant to this doctrine a court 
would be required to attempt to understand and to assess in detail the data and methodology 
an agency used to address a complicated scientific issue
129.  
 
Advocates of the hard-look doctrine point out that a hard-look approach would stimulate 
agencies to take good policy decisions. Political controls would not be adequate to assure 
agencies make wise policy decisions
130. Opponents of the hard-look approach point out the 
courts should defer to the agencies’ statement of reasons and facts for most of the agencies’ 
decisions are policy decisions based on the interpretation and determination of uncertain 
scientific facts. A more detailed consideration of the facts and reasons would not eliminate the 
need to make policy judgements in favour of one or the other risk. Therefore hard-look 
review would merely result in delay
131.   
 
Indeed, one may agree with the opponents that it can be questioned whether the hard-look 
approach will generate better policy decisions. From the perspective of accountability and 
from the perspective of expertise, the agencies are in a better position than judges to assess 
complicated facts and scientific data. Therefore, it would be very inefficient when the judges 
would redo the agency’s work and would require the agencies to take a new decision on the 
basis of their assessment of the facts. With regard to these factors, it would be better if the 
courts take a more deferential approach to the determinations of facts and reasons by the 
agencies and only intervene when agencies evidently have made errors in interpreting the 
facts and justifying their policy decisions.  
 
For now, as will be discussed in the next paragraph, the opinion of the Supreme Court in 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association v. State Farm provides the standard for the scope 
of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” test
132.  
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7.2.1. Hard look review: Case law of the Supreme Court   
 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had issued a rule that 
rescinded the passive restraint requirement contained in the Modified Standard 208. This 
standard required that each car was either equipped with automatic seatbelts or with automatic 
airbags. The agency’s changed view of the standard was related to the election of President 
Reagan and his deregulation policies.  In the view of the Court the revocation of the rule had 
to be tested under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. It described the scope of review 
under this test as narrow and warned that a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency. Nevertheless the Court found the agency must articulate a satisfactory explanation 
for its action, including a rational connection between facts found and the choices made. The 
Court then formulates under which circumstances an agency rule would be “arbitrary and 
capricious”: 
 
“… if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to 
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, 
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 
before it, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise.”  
 
In applying this standard of review the Court reversed the NHTSA’s revocation of the rule on 
two different bases. The first reason for finding the rescission “arbitrary and capricious” is 
that NHTSA gave no consideration at all to the option of modifying the Standard to require 
that airbags would be installed. The agency had determined detachable automatic belts would 
not attain anticipated safety benefits because so many people will detach the mechanism. 
However, given the effectiveness ascribed to airbag technology by the agency, the Court was 
of the opinion that the mandate of the Safety Act to achieve traffic safety would suggest that 
the logical response to the faults of the detachable seatbelts would be to require the 
installation of airbags. Although the Court confirmed, it generally defers to the policy 
alternatives being made by the agency, the airbag option was more than a policy alternative to 
the passive restraint standard: it was a technological alternative within the ambit of the 
existing standard. Therefore, the agency should have addressed this alternative way of 
achieving the objectives of the Act and should have given adequate reasons for its 
abandonment.  
 
  44The second reason the Court found the revocation of the rule “arbitrary and capricious” was 
that the agency was too quick to dismiss the safety benefits of automatic seatbelts. NHTSA’s 
critical finding was that, in the light of the industry’s plans to install readily detachable belts, 
it could not reliably predict even a 5 per cent increase as the minimum level of used increase. 
The Court thought there was no direct evidence in support of the NHTA’s finding that 
detachable automatic belts cannot be predicted to yield a substantial increase in usage. The 
empirical evidence on the record reveals more than a doubling of the usage rate experiences 
with manual belts. Although the Court explicitly acknowledged that it should in general defer 
to an agency’s finding with respect to the uncertainty about the efficacy of certain measures, 
the agency had failed to explain how the findings of less than 5 per cent increase could be 
reconciled with the evidence of the increased use of manual belts.   
 
It is interesting to note that the majority of the Court did not deal with the question whether 
the change of policy as a consequence of the election of a new President, should have had 
implications for the scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. The 
majority confirmed that every change of policy should be based on a reasoned analysis, 
indicating that presidential involvement in the agency’s rulemaking process would not lead to 
a different review standard. On the other hand, the dissenting judges were of the opinion that 
the change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes, is a perfectly 
reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of a regulatory 
program. Therefore, they were of the opinion that the agency is entitled, within the bounds 
established by Congress, to change policy in the light of the philosophy of the administration, 
indicating the Court should defer to those policy choices.   
 
The reasoning of the Court in State Farm illustrates that the Court thinks the “capricious and 
arbitrary” standard empowers the courts to review carefully whether the agency has 
considered all relevant scientific facts and whether its decision can be justified on the basis of 
the evidence of the record. However, since the Court makes some remarks on the deference to 
the agency’s choice of policy alternatives and the agency’s findings on uncertainty, the 
opinion of the Court does not indicate that courts should assess the agency’s work in detail or 
should substitute the agency’s assessments. Since the NHTSA left out a policy alternative it 
had previously deemed effective and since its record contained contradicting evidence, the 
  45Court’s reversal of the decision can very well be reconciled with this deferring approach. So, 
therefore it might be argued the Court has not approved the hard-look approach
133.  
 
7.3. Interpretation of the law: Chevron 
 
Before the rise of the regulatory state, it was relatively clear that it was for the courts and not 
the executive to “say what the law is”
134. Consequently, the courts reviewed thoroughly 
whether the administration had respected the law. However, in the twentieth century, the role 
of the courts in determining the law was complicated, because Congress frequently had 
delegated discretionary, policy-making powers to administrative agencies. As a consequence 
of these developments courts sometimes said that agencies were entitled to interpret the 
statutes they had to administer and that courts would defer as long as the agencies’ 
interpretations were reasonable
135. This idea represented the principles of administrative 
autonomy, limited judicial interference with the process of regulation and democratic 
accountability. At the same time, many courts continued to insist that the interpretation of 
statutes was first and foremost a judicial task.  
 
It was not until 1984, when the Court decided the famous Chevron
136 case, that it became 
clear under what circumstances the courts should defer to the agencies’ interpretations of  the 
law. In Chevron the Supreme Court decided that the courts should defer to the agencies’ 
interpretations of the law, if the law permits the agencies to make policy judgements and if 
the agencies’ interpretations are reasonable
137.  
 
In Chevron the interpretation of the words “stationary source” in the Clean Air Act were at 
issue. Under influence of the Reagan administration, the EPA promulgated rules that allowed 
states to define an entire plant, containing many different kinds of pollution-emitting units, as 
if it were a single “stationary source”.  Thus, a firm could modify one unit within the plant 
and increase its emissions, or introduce a new unit, without complying with requirements of 
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did not increase, because it reduced equivalent emissions from other, existing units (bubble 
concept). The Court of Appeals held that the statute did not permit the EPA to allow a 
‘bubble-like’ definition of  “stationary source”, because it would undermine Congress’ goal of 
speedy compliance with national air quality standards.  
 
The Supreme Court did not approve the Court of Appeal’s approach. The Supreme Court 
formulated two important questions that may arise when a court reviews an agency’s 
construction of the statute it administers. First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the 
end of the matter, for the court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress. If, however the court determines Congress has not directly 
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction 
of the statute. Rather if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction 
of the statute.  
 
In the light of these principles the Supreme Court thought it was clear the Court of Appeals 
misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing the regulations at issue. Based on the 
examination of the legislation and its history, the Supreme Court confirmed Congress did not 
have a specific intention on the applicability of the bubble concept. According to the Court, 
EPA’s use of the ‘bubble concept’ was a reasonable policy choice within the ambit of the 
Clean Air Act, which seeks to accommodate progress in reducing air pollution with economic 
growth. Therefore, it unanimously reversed the judgement of the Court of Appeals. The Court 
justified the deference to the agencies’ policies decisions on the following grounds: 
 
“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing 
political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy 
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, 
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s view of wise policy to 
inform its judgements. While agencies are not directly accountable to the 
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political 
branch of the government to make such policy choices-resolving the 
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not 
resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with the 
administration of the statute in the light of everyday realities.” 
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The relevance of Chevron is that it replaced a statute-by-statute evaluation of the agency’s 
discretion with an across the board presumption that in case Congress has not expressed a 
clear intent, the agency was meant to enjoy discretion
138. This discretion is based upon an 
implicit congressional intent of law-interpreting power, which can be justified on the ground 
that the resolution of ambiguities in statutes is sometimes a question of policy as much as it is 
one of law. As a consequence of their expertise and accountability to the President, agencies 
are in a better position than the courts to make policy choices within the ambit of the law
139.  
 
8.  Conclusion  
 
The position of independent agencies with broad regulatory powers may well be reconciled 
with the Separation of Powers Principle of the US Constitution.  It follows from the case law 
of the Supreme Court that it was never the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to make a 
hermetic division of government power into three branches. Congress may make any 
arrangement, not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, as long as all of the three branches 
can effectively perform their core function and the checks and balances between the three 
powers are maintained.  
 
The more functional checks and balances approach to the Separation of Powers principle has 
been well established in US doctrine and case law by now. In case independent agencies are 
created each power should be able to check and balance the powers of the other powers in 
controlling the agencies’ actions. The President, Congress and the Judiciary continuously 
check the actions of both the independent and executive agencies. In addition, a fourth power, 
not mentioned in the Constitution, plays an important role in maintaining the checks and 
balances between the three original powers. Indeed, the public forms an effective check on 
the agencies’ actions through the participation in administrative procedures. Judicially 
imposed procedural requirements, enforce the agencies’ duty to adequately respond to 
comments being made by the public on proposed rules.  
 
From the analysis, it follows that from a legal perspective the way the four actors control the 
activities of the independent agencies does not differ much from the way they control the 
activities of the executive agencies. Although the President will give more deference to the 
policy choices being made by independent agencies, it does not seem that the constitutional 
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executive agencies. The analysis shows each of the three branches and the public have their 
own role in controlling the agencies’ actions.  
 
The way the four actors perform their supervisory roles is a dynamic process and may adapt 
to changing circumstances. Indeed, due to the enormous growth of the activities of executive 
and independent agencies there was a growing need for a unitary force that would coordinate 
the agencies’ activities. Due to a lack of institutional capacities, Congress has not been able to 
lay down a general philosophy for the administrative state, in order to ensure that the agencies 
actions are cost-effective, beneficial and that the agencies take account of the effects of their 
decisions on the policies that are formulated by other agencies. These circumstances explain 
why the Reagan era was the beginning of an era of presidential administration.  
 
The growing importance of the presidential role does not have to upset the checks and 
balances between the different actors. Up till now, there does not seem a clear trend for courts 
to give more deference to agencies policies’ that were directed by the President. As a matter 
of fact, the paper has illustrated that the courts have responded to the tremendous growth of 
administrative rulemaking by imposing strict procedural and substantive requirements on the 
agencies.  
 
Finally, a lot of the criticism of the agencies’ activities can be traced back to the quality of the 
organic acts. Often, Congress has failed to give substantial guidance to the agencies on which 
factors they should take into account in formulating rules and on how to evaluate the benefits 
and costs of their actions. Therefore, various proposals have been made on how Congress 
could improve the quality of legislation. For instance, it could improve the quality of 
legislation by laying down clear substantive principles and by trying to formulate legislation 
that is based on market-based incentives rather than on command-control.  
 
In case Congress succeeds in improving the quality of legislation, there may be less need for 
the delegation of broad regulatory powers, administrative rulemaking and for presidential 
administration.   
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